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Developing countries require assistance, and should be assisted, to maximise the potential gains of 
their participation in the multilateral trading system. Since the launch of the Doha Round, there has 
been a sizeable increase in both developed country commitments to trade-related technical assistance 
and capacity building (TACB) and in debates about the appropriate purpose and nature of that 
assistance.  Here, two trends are worth noting. First, a series of complaints about the effectiveness of 
assistance have emerged, ranging from concerns about donor-driven assistance, biased objectives and 
inadequate needs assessments to  poor donor coordination and evaluation, fluctuating resources, poor 
conceptualisation, weak support for local institutions, and inadequate linkages to broader 
development strategies.  Second, there has been a revitalisation of interest in trade-related TACB for 
activities related to the development of trade capacity (i.e., activities aimed at building supply-side 
capacity, supporting economic transition, adjustment and diversification, improving competitiveness, 
meeting technical standards, increasing access to trade finance, infrastructure development, and trade 
promotion in specific productive sectors).
2   
 
While acknowledging the urgent need for TACB to build trade capacity in developing countries, this 
paper calls for greater critical attention to the second major dimension of trade-related TACB—that 
related to the participation of developing countries in the world trading system (e.g., in negotiations 
and in dispute settlements processes) and to the legal, regulatory and policy aspects of the 
implementation of trade agreements.
3  This paper concurs on the need for more demand-driven, 
efficient, coordinated and service-oriented TACB, but also argues that helping developing countries 
leverage their participation in the trading system requires moving beyond the bureaucratic tinkering 
and political exhortation that characterises much of the contemporary debate. 
 
In examining trade-related TACB, it is important first properly to consider its political dimensions.  
At the launch of both the Uruguay and Doha Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, the promise 
of trade-related TACB was deployed as a bargaining “carrot” to build developing country support for 
agreement (Whalley, 1999; Tandon, 2002).  Further, implicit in the discussion of TACB is a 
recognition that the outcomes of negotiations are often asymmetric and that trade obligations place 
particular burdens on developing countries, particularly in areas with rapid deadlines for 
compliance.
4 Many developing countries argue that their obligations to implement resource-intensive 
WTO disciplines should be linked to their capacity and considered in light of their other development 
priorities. While trade-related TACB is considered vital to address their financial, institutional and 
human resource constraints, developing countries insist that the promise of assistance should not be 
                                                 
1 Global Economic Governance Programme, University of Oxford. 
2 The case for greater ‘aid for trade’ has, among others, been taken up by UK government officials (Brown, 2004; Prowse, 
2005), but also by the new European Trade Commissioner (Mandelson, 2005) and by staff at the World Bank (Hoekman, 
2004; Rugabiza & Rantzien, 2005) each of which have offered proposals for financing, structuring and administrating 
increased finance.  
3 The challenges related to improving capacity to trade (including institutional capacity to administer agreements) are taken 
up in a related background paper also commissioned for the 2005 Human Development Report. See, Jensen (2005).  
4 Beyond obligations to reduce trade barriers, the Uruguay Round agreements also require developing countries to 
undertake a range of regulatory and administrative reforms (including the formation of intellectual property systems, the 
upgrading of sanitary, technical and phytosanitary standards, and improvements in import licensing procedures and customs 
valuations). As noted by Finger (1999), the Round did not take into account the cost of implementing these reforms. For 
many of the least developed countries, the cost of implementation has been estimated as the equivalent of a full year's 
development budget, much of which may have been more productively devoted to other development purposes.    2
used as a salve to facilitate their acquiescence to unbalanced rules or to divert attention from their 
key negotiation priorities—including the revision of the most onerous obligations, and the 
meaningful operationalisation of provisions on SDT (e.g., including greater flexibility in 
implementing and complying with obligations) (Whalley, 1999). 
 
Noting this political context, and that unequal political and economic power relations are a defining 
feature of the global trading environment, this paper argues that achieving a fair and predictable 
trading environment—a goal to which all WTO Members purportedly aspire—requires a 
fundamental overhaul of the way in which TACB for trade negotiations, regulation and policy reform 
is pursued.   
 
More specifically, to extract maximum benefit from their participation in the trading system, TACB 
efforts must recognize the need to challenge the existing balance of power in trade decision-making,   
empower developing countries to act independently with respect to domestic reforms, and take 
seriously the need to build developing country power in international negotiations. To realise these 
objectives, developing countries require, at minimum:  
 
1.  a team of technically competent, diplomatically-savvy negotiators in Geneva that can 
participate effectively and persuasively in ongoing negotiations and decision-making;  
 
2.  an equally informed back-up team in capital able to articulate the various national interests, 
negotiating objectives and strategies, as well as a layer of expertise external to government 
(in business, academia, research centres and NGOs) that can provide trade policy advice to 
government; 
 
3.  an effective domestic policymaking process which involves a spectrum of relevant 
government agencies and draws systematically on expertise and advice external to the 
government;  
 
4.  an ability to forge, maintain and service effective coalitions with other countries on particular 
issues of negotiation; and 
 
5.  the capacity to use the WTO’s dispute settlement process to defend and advance their rights.  
 
In each of these five areas, developing country capacities fall far short of their needs. Existing TACB 
efforts rarely devote adequate attention to these issues; where assistance is available it is often poorly 
conceived and delivered. On the negotiation front, for example, TACB still fails even to ensure that 
the poorest developing countries are ‘in the room’ far less ‘at the table’ in any meaningful sense. 
 
Part A of this paper briefly introduces the context and key components of TACB for trade 
negotiations and policy reform, as well as the main actors involved. Part B reviews some of the most 
commonly-cited problems with trade-related TACB.
5  Building on this review, Part C highlights five 
areas related to negotiations and trade policy reforms where developing country needs for TACB are 
high, but where TACB resources are currently lacking, misdirected or miss the mark. Part D 
concludes with recommendations for possible reforms to TACB in the area of trade negotiations, 
policy and regulatory reform.  Essential elements of this reform must include: a) a new institutional 
approach which insulates available funding from political pressures and promotes independent 
advice; b) a commitment to building long-term policy capacity in developing countries; and c) a 
willingness to help developing countries participate effectively in the international process—on their 
own terms. 
 
                                                 
5 While this paper focuses primarily on WTO-related issues, many of the TACB-related challenges also arise in the regional 
and bilateral trading context. 
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PART A 
 
TACB FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND POLICY REFORM: AN OVERVIEW 
 
In practical terms, TACB for trade policy, negotiations and rules implementation usually consists of 
activities such as seminars, workshops, training programs in trade rules and procedures, courses on 
negotiating skills, legal advice and assistance with preparing draft laws, technical missions, the 
provision of manuals, guides, documents, and/or support for research and data collection.  
 
This kind of TACB involves partnerships among a great number of agencies in both donor and 
recipient countries, each of which usually has its own distinct priorities, operating arrangements, 
timeframes and financial resources. Donors include multilateral and bilateral development agencies, 
NGOs, industry groups, academic centres, think tanks and philanthropic foundations.
6  Key 
multilateral agencies involved in implementing trade-related TACB include the International Trade 
Centre, UNCTAD, UNDP, World Bank, WTO, AITIC. Also engaged are regional organizations and 
development banks (such as UNECLAC and the Inter-American Development Bank) as well as UN 
specialized and voluntary agencies (including WHO, FAO, WCO, WIPO, UNEP and UNIDO) in 
their respective areas of competence.
7  
 
On the developing country side, the range of actors involved includes Ministries of Trade, Foreign 
Affairs, Health and Agriculture as well as specialized agencies (such as customs and standards 





COMMONLY-CITED PROBLEMS WITH TRADE-RELATED TACB 
 
A review of recent evaluations of trade-related TACB reveals a recurring set of shortcomings—in its 
quantity but also in its conceptualisation, quality and delivery.
8 The key challenges commonly 
referred to in the literature include: 
 
I. Inadequate assessment and articulation of needs 
 
Developing countries rarely lead decision-making regarding the allocation of trade-related TACB. 
The quality and relevance of trade-related TACB is constrained by inadequate needs assessments, 
failures to consult with a wide-range of actors to define priorities, and limited developing country 
capacity to participate actively its design (Makombe, 2003). In many instances, developing countries 
fail to know exactly what to ask for and poorly articulate their needs. As such, they often receive sub-




II. Donor-driven priorities  
                                                 
6 For specific information on these programs, see the Trade-Related Assistance and Capacity Building Database 
(established jointly in 2002 by the Secretariats of both the WTO and the OECD) which maintains details and funding levels 
of the TACB activities of bilateral, regional and multilateral donors (http://tcbdb.wto.org.).  Disappointingly, the database 
omits the many activities supported independently by non-profit organizations, private foundations, and universities. 
7 UNIDO, for example, is working to help assist with the development of the productive capacities of industry and to build 
capacities to produce exportable products. The FAO is similarly working in the agricultural sector, particularly to help 
countries meet product standards. The WHO provides considerable support to developing countries with respect to the 
implementation of public-health friendly intellectual property policies. 
8 These studies include reviews of multilateral programs such as JITAP and the Integrated Framework as well as bilateral 
trade-related TACB programs. See, for example, WTO/OECD (2003), Bretton Woods Project (2002), Da Silva & Weston 
(2002), Ladd, (2003), Solignac Lecomte (2001), Reality of Aid Network (2003), Prowse (2002), Rajapartirana et al (2000), 
Rowden (2001), and Tan (2002).   4
 
Trade-related TACB is too often biased toward donor priorities and economic interests (Makombe, 
2003). Bias can take the form of negative discrimination (where donors avoid funding activities that 
could hurt their short-term domestic interest), positive discrimination (where donors prioritize 
assistance that might assist their domestic economies), tied-aid, or buy-offs (Lecomte, 2001; Reality 
of Aid Network, 2003).  
 
In 2001, for example, TACB for the so-called “new issues”—a Northern trade priority—represented 
over 50 percent of TACB spending for trade policy and regulation (trade and competition (23 
percent), trade facilitation (17 percent) trade and environment (8 percent), trade and investment (3 
percent)) (see Table 1).  This figure stands in stark contrast to the mere one percent of trade policy 
and regulation TACB devoted to agricultural issues—the undisputed priority issue for developing 
countries (Oxford Policy Management, 2003:18).  Even where developing countries have 
systematically identified and presented their needs to the donor community (as has been the case with 
the New Economic Partnership for Africa (NEPAD)), the donor community remains more focused on 
its own initiatives than on strengthening those proposed by developing countries. 
 
Table 1. Commitments for trade-related TACB in the area of trade policy and 






Total 2,284 466   
Trade mainstreaming in PRSPs/development plans  269 95  20
Technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures (SPS)  210 58  12
Trade facilitation procedures  145 77  17
Customs valuation  58 4  1
Tariff reforms  3 0  0
Regional trade agreements (RTAs)  15 3  1
Accession 56 10  2
Dispute settlement  125 1  0
Trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS)  59 9  2
Agriculture 72 5  1
Services 88 5  1
Tariff negotiations – non-agricultural market access  235 8  2
Rules 63 1  0
Training in trade negotiation techniques  52 3  1
Trade and environment  66 37  8
Trade and competition  109 108  23
Trade and investment  29 13  3
Transparency and government procurement  12 2  0
Trade education/training  618 26  6
 
Source: Oxford Policy Management (2003: 81) and OECD/WTO trade-related capacity building project database: 
http://www.tcbdb.wto.org.  Note that the database is too incomplete to devise figures for 2002 or 2003. 
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Multilateral TACB has not escaped pressures from particular donors. A key example cited in this 
regard is the earmarking by the EU of its contributions to WTO-administered TACB for work related 
to the Singapore Issues (Oxford Policy Management, 2003). Concerns about this led to the 
establishment of the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda Trust Funds (though informal conversations 
with WTO staff confirm that earmarking still takes place and that some countries continue to tie 
resources to specific projects of interest to them).  
 
III. Biased content 
 
In addition to complaints about bias in the choice of priorities for trade-related TACB, there are also 
concerns about bias in its design and delivery. Legal and technical advice often devotes too little 
attention to ensuring developing countries know how to exploit options that could help them to 
accommodate public policy and development objectives.  The tendency for the objectives and 
orientation of TACB most frequently and inappropriately to focus on donor rather than recipient 
interests is most pronounced in bilateral programs. One example is the United States’ use of TACB 
monies to promote greater levels of intellectual property protection and enforcement in developing 
countries beyond TRIPS requirements to the benefit of U.S. industries.  A further example is that of 
assistance provided by USAID in Nigeria and Uganda—which failed properly to advise countries of 
the flexibilities available to them by the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (MSF, 
CPTech & Oxfam International, 2002; Musungu, 2003; Pengelly, 2003). 
 
In the context of strong economic, political and ideological tensions about appropriate economic 
policies, it is difficult for international organisations to implement ‘neutral’ technical assistance. 
Moreover, it is often the case that in addition to the independent and objective advice they expect 
from international organisations, developing countries also need sources of assistance that are in fact 
biased toward advancing their interests.   Beyond ‘neutral’ training trade about rules, rights and 
obligations, developing countries need advice and training that helps them explore and evaluate the 
best possible options and strategies to achieve their distinct public policy objectives.  
 
IV. Inadequate donor evaluation and coordination 
 
Over the past several years, the donor community has become increasingly attuned to the need for 
greater coordination and inadequate attention to evaluation. In particular, there is recognition of the 
need for tools and indicators for the evaluation of trade-related TACB and for greater transparency 
regarding the size and purpose of different TACB initiatives (OECD, 2001 & 2003; WTO (2000; 
2001a & 2001b; WTO/OECD, 2002 & 2003). Without adequate financial information about the 
specific technical aspects of cooperation programmes, it is difficult to monitor, assess or improve the 
contribution of TACB to the trading prospects of developing countries (Pengelly, 2003).
9 Of 
particular concern is the tendency to evaluate only individual projects or programmes of particular 
institutions or initiatives rather than their impact on broad trade and development objectives. 
Moreover, the design and delivery of many training programmes and workshops fail to meet best 
practices for ensuring a meaningful transfer of knowledge and skills (Kostecki, 2001). 
 
V.  Inadequate funding 
 
Post-Doha, many developed countries have boosted their participation in multilateral initiatives and 
programmes, such as the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund, the Integrated 
Framework, and the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP) (see Annex 1 for a 
brief summary of these programs).  By far the largest supporters of multilateral TACB as a 
proportion of their GDP are Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Norway—with the United 
States and Japan lagging far behind (see Table 1). 
                                                 
9 A series of further challenges to evaluating TACB were identified at a 2004 OECD meeting, including attribution 
problems, time lags, difficulties evaluating the quality of processes and engaging local actors in evaluations, difficulties 
disseminating and internalizing results of evaluations in donor agencies and partner countries. See Carey (2004).    6
 
Yet despite efforts to increase its quantity, TACB resources fall far short of both the commitments 
made and of developing country needs. Resources are particularly scarce in key areas stated as 
priorities by developing countries. In some instances, donor commitments to increase trade-related 
TACB represent a diversion of resources from other pressing development priorities rather than an 
allocation of new resources. Moreover, while support for multilateral TACB has increased over time, 
many donors prioritise bilateral programs which they are free more explicitly to link to their own 
objectives (USTR/USAID, 2002; DFID, 2004a/2004b; CIDA, 2003).  
 
Box 1. Contributions to the WTO Regular Budget 
 
Contributions to the Regular Budget of the WTO are made according to a Members’ share of world trade 
in goods and services.  This means that developing countries which are heavily engaged in trade 
sometimes pay more than countries with a far higher GDP per capita and Human Development Index. In 
2004, China, Korea, and Mexico were the 9
th, 12
th and 14
th highest contributor to the WTO’s regular 
budget—ahead of developed countries such as Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, Australia, Ireland, Denmark 
and Norway (see Annex 3). 
 
VI. Weak support for local capacity 
 
A lack of imagination in design and delivery often compromises the effectiveness of available TACB 
resources.  Frequently-cited problems include: lack of investment in local expertise and institutions, 
duplication, and over-reliance on short-term, one-off or stand alone approaches (ICTSD &IISD, 
2003). Donors too often favour their own Northern consultants, project managers and private sector 
actors for the provision of TACB over long-term investments in developing country consultants, 
legal teams, NGOs, universities or think-tanks.  
 
VII. Weak linkages to broader development strategies 
 
Post-Doha, donors have intensified discussion of the importance of TACB for development and 
poverty reduction and the need for strengthened dialogue among trade policy and development 
experts.
10  To date, however, donor efforts to make TACB a more integral part of development 
cooperation policies have fallen short of expectations. Efforts to integrate trade and TACB needs 
assessments into Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are reported to have thus far yielded 
little impact on a country’s trade strategy or negotiating positions. A diverse range of actors (the 
Overseas Development Institute, the IMF, Christian Aid and Novib) have, for example, expressed a 
common concern that, to date, PRSPs have said very little about trade policy and that any attention 
that is paid to trade is inadequate (Bieckmann, F. & C. van der Borgh, 20002; Ladd. 2003; Luke, 
2002; UNDP, 2001; Koliadina & Lankes, 2003).
11 Moreover, some analysts have questioned whether 
the PRSP process—can provide the comprehensive development framework needed for considering 
trade strategies (Ladd, 2003; UNDP, 2001).  
 
Table 2.   Contributions to Multilateral TACB Trust Funds (2003)  
(USD thousands) 
 





                                                 
10  A key indicator of this trends is the increased number of high levels meetings among trade and development 
communities, including a DFID-led Trade, Growth and Poverty Conference in December 2003 (which included 
examination of how to improve the trade policy content of PRSPs in practice at the country level), and an OECD-
DAC/WTO Meeting on Trade Capacity Building from 2-3 March 2004 in Paris,  
11  Ladd (2003), for example, argues that “[T]rade policy choices are rarely underpinned by a holistic analysis of poverty in 
each country. PRSPs fail to consider the impacts of trade on different groups of poor and vulnerable people.  Effects are not 
disaggregated between consumers, producers and employers, between urban and rural populations, or by gender. 
Dimensions of poverty beyond income—risk and insecurity, access to services, and empowerment—are almost completely 
ignored.”   7
Australia       366  366 
Austria       230  230 
Belgium  26     482  508 
Canada  1301 429  671  421  2,823 
Denmark  1676 120  1000  728  3524 
Finland  290 86    488  864 
France  621 26  538  1553 2738 
Germany  1283     1204  2487 
Iceland       11  11 
Ireland  169   236  121 525 
Italy  402     1152  1554 
Japan   25    705  730 
Korea  10     210  220 
Liechtenstein       15  15 
Luxembourg       164  164 
Netherlands  1715 68  250  1226  3259 
Norway  1471 220  2000  956  4647 
Spain  136     226 362 
Sweden  1549 151    2122  3822 
Switzerland  5272   300  558 6130 
United Kingdom  350 138    909  1397 
United States  250   400 2238  2888 
 
Source:  See www.wto.org, www.intracen.org, and www.oecd.org as well as the joint OECD-WTO trade 




UNDER-ADDRESSED DEVELOPING COUNTRY PRIORITIES AND  
AREAS OF OUSTANDING NEED 
 
The following discussion reviews five areas critical to developing countries that achieve inadequate 
attention. It makes the case that without far greater emphasis in each of these areas, trade-related 
TACB will continue to fall far short of the mark.  So long as TACB continues gingerly to turn a blind 
eye to critical power dynamics in the world trading system, it will fall far short of addressing the core 
of developing country needs with respect to their participation in the world trading system. 
 
I. Negotiating resources in Geneva and for Ministerial meetings 
 
“Some 30-35 developing countries, including Brazil, Egypt, India and some LDCs like Bangladesh, 
are effective and active participants at WTO…and accordingly exert an influence on the rule-making 
processes…The rest of the developing countries, including many of the LDCs, are currently little 
more than spectators…if they are present at all” (CIPR, 2001).  
 
Developing countries are out-gunned in multilateral trade negotiations—both in terms of basic 
representation and in terms of the size and skills of the negotiating teams they are able to field. It is 
openly acknowledged that some least-developed countries (LDCs) lack the capacity to participate 
meaningfully at all in WTO negotiations and decision-making. 
 
In 2004, thirty three developing countries (either WTO Members or countries in the process of 
accession) still lacked permanent representation in Geneva (see Table 3). A major reason cited for 
their absence is the cost of setting up and running a mission.
12  
                                                 
12 A 2001 Commonwealth Secretariat Study estimated the total cost of setting up and running a 3 to 4 person mission in 
Geneva to be approximately $340,000 per year (Weekes et al, 2001). Given increasing costs of living, most agree that   8
 
Table 3: Developing countries without representation in Geneva
13 
 
Antigua and Barbuda  Armenia  Bahamas* 
Belize Central  African  Republic  Chad 
Dominica Equatorial  Guinea*  Fiji 
Gambia Grenada  Guinea  Bissau 
Guyana Lao  People’s  Democratic 
Republic* 
Malawi 
Maldives Namibia  Niger 
Papua New Guinea  Saint Kitts & Nevis  Saint Lucia 
Samoa*  Sao Tome and Principe*  Seychelles* 
Sierra Leone  Solomon Islands  St Vincent & the Grenadines 
Suriname Swaziland  Tajikistan* 
Togo Tonga*  Vanuatu* 
 
*WTO Observers (in the process of accession) 
 
Developing country negotiators have far fewer negotiators on average in Geneva than their more 
powerful trading partners.  With a combined population of around 900 million people, the ‘Quad’ 
group of countries (Japan, EU, Canada and the United States) have double the number of 
professional staff permanently stationed in Geneva than for the entire developing world (representing 
4.1 billion people) (see Table 4).  Whereas the EU fields some 140 professional staff tasked with 
Geneva-based trade negotiators,
14 the average least developed country Mission has an average of just 
two professional staff tasked with trade policy. While the Quad countries together field one 
negotiator for every 4.8 million citizens, developing countries field only one negotiator for every 10 
million citizens (see Table 4). Norway has one negotiator per every half million of its citizens. India, 
on the other hand, has one Geneva-based negotiator for each 150 million of its citizens (see Table 5).   
 








Number of citizens 
(millions) per 1 Geneva 
negotiator  
Quad  183     894.8  4.89 
OECD 222  1,199.3  5.40 
Developing Countries  406  4,123.4  10.1 
 









European Union*  3.33 
                                                                                                                                                 
$340,000 per year would likely cover only salaries and living expenses, but not operational costs related to the running of a 
mission in Geneva. 
13  Source: www.wto.org/english/tratop c/devel c/genwk c.htm, “WTO organizes ‘Geneva Weeks’ for non-resident 
delegations”, viewed on 19/11/2004. 
14 This figure combines staff at the EC mission, the representative of the EU Council and the staff of EU member country 
Mission. This figure was derived from information in Annex 3.  
15 Sources: Population (HDR 2004), Number of professional staff (WTO Directory, 2002).  See also Annex 3 for a 
breakdown of statistics by country. 
16 Sources: Population (HDR 2004), Number of professional staff (WTO Directory, 2002).     9
Japan 5.78 
Kenya 10.5 












* EU figures includes individual EU Member state negotiators and EU negotiators. Annex 2 presents a 
breakdown of EU figures. 
 
A further way to capture the imbalance in negotiating power is to consider the level of representation 
relative to the importance of trade to a country’s GDP.  The United States and EU both have large 
trading interests to protect—hence the size of their delegations. But many developing countries also 
have important trading interests to advance. In most instances, the relative importance of trade to 
developing country economies is far higher than for developed countries. In the United States, for 
example, trade accounts for 25 percent of its GDP and it fields 16 permanent negotiators in Geneva 
to represent its interests.  Malawi and Togo, on the other hand, have no permanent representation in 
Geneva despite the fact that trade accounts for 86 percent and 79 percent of their GDP respectively 
(see Table 6). 
 





Average trade to 
GDP, 1990-2002 
Number of professional negotiating 
representatives in Geneva 




































                                                 
17 Sources: Trade/GDP figures from World Development Indicators (April 2004), number of professional staff (WTO 
Directory 2002 combined with verbal updates from some delegates in Missions). See also Annex 3. 
   10




Even those developing countries with representation in Geneva often lack the resources to monitor 
and participate effectively in the multiplicity of negotiations and discussions simultaneously under 
way. The Doha Round launched negotiations in over 20 areas and the ongoing work of the WTO 
involves almost 50 different committees, councils or working groups which meet on a regular basis.  
 
Many Missions simply abandon the effort to monitor or attend the full range of WTO meetings—let 
alone to contribute substantively—instead conceding that they can only devote attention to two or 
three core issues. In some developing country Missions, even those delegates listed as covering WTO 
issues may also be charged with other UN agencies such as UNCTAD, the ILO or WIPO.  A 
comparison of three Missions illustrates the point.  The Permanent Mission of Canada dedicates one 
of its professional staff solely to the ongoing discussions on environment and trade. In the Tanzanian 
Mission, one of its two trade professionals is charged with handling not one, but three of the most 
‘complex and high stakes issues—services, non-agricultural market access, and trade facilitation—as 
well all UNCTAD meetings. The other is charged with agriculture, dispute settlement, TRIPS and 
Rules issues, while sharing responsibility for all other issues, such as technical barriers to trade, 
sanitary and phytosanitary standards, subsidies and development. Even a middle-income developing 
country like South Africa faces severe challenges—with just one person dedicated to handling 
agriculture, TRIPS, and trade and environment as well as other miscellaneous issues that arise. While 
countries may be able to ‘show up’ to meetings, few can hope to contribute substantively far less to 
solve problems or lead negotiations. 
 
Developing country governments can also rarely match the depth of government attention that 
developed countries can dedicate to each of the WTO negotiation areas (and often also for each 
particular bilateral or regional negotiation). The United States, for example, regularly flies teams of 
staff to Geneva for particular issue-specific negotiations. By contrast, many developing country 
officials arrive in Geneva with little understanding of trade matters (and the skills they acquire are 
not often well-used when they return home). Even where countries have benefited from assistance to 
train staff, many lack the resources to fly the relevant skilled professionals from capital to attend 
negotiations.   
 
Staffing and financial shortages place developing countries at a particular disadvantage as the 
number of parallel meetings proliferates in the lead up to and during Ministerials and mini-
Ministerials.  Even where developing countries have expertise in their capitals, few can afford to 
devote significant resources to sponsor large delegations.  At the Doha WTO Ministerial, the EU 
boasted an official delegation of some 508 individuals (including some 50 delegates from the 
European Commission), Japan had 159 delegates, Canada had 62 and the United States had 51. At 
the smaller end of the scale, countries such as Haiti had only one representative (Jawara, 2003). 
 
Finally, countries in the process of WTO accession face enormous pressures from individual WTO 
Members to take on GATT-plus commitments and few have a strong presence in Geneva. While 
these countries have a particular need for strong negotiating capacity and for independent advice, the 
sources available to them are limited. While the power balance is perhaps inevitably tilted against 
acceding countries, it is possible that stronger representation in Geneva and better equipped 
negotiators might be better able to resist some of the more onerous deals (Oxfam, 2003b).  
 
Few systematic efforts have been made to assist developing countries to increase the quantity and 
quality of their representation in Geneva. The WTO finances an annual ‘Geneva’ week—where it 
hosts government officials from those countries with no representation in Geneva to inform them of 
recent developments in the WTO. The WTO also provides funding for interns to serve in developing 
country missions in Geneva.  While important, such WTO initiatives fall far short of addressing 
fundamentally the lack of permanent or adequately staffed, resourced and supported Missions.  
Moreover, it is not always clear, however, that countries are selecting appropriate individuals for   11
available trainings—with some coming several times and others hailing from not directly relevant 
ministries (CUTS-Africa Resource Centre, 2001).   
 
A further complication for developing countries—particularly the smallest and least-developed—is 
the task of devising trade policy positions amidst a complex array of intersecting multilateral, 
regional, sub-regional, and bilateral negotiations.  Many West African countries, for example, face 
the task of analysing the inter-sections between their negotiations as part of the EU-ACP Economic 
Partnership Agreements on the one hand and WTO negotiations on the other.  Zambia provides 
another example; its trade officials juggle concurrent negotiations related to the WTO, the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) with the United States, and Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPA) with the European Union. 
 
II. Asymmetries in access to ‘back up’ and expertise 
 
The effectiveness of most developing countries in Geneva is severely undermined by a lack of 
technical and substantive ‘back up’ from capital on the specific issues under discussion and on the 
implications of different proposals for domestic priorities. A focus only on the number of negotiators 
in Geneva thus underestimates the power asymmetries at play and the depth of relative developed 
country negotiating strength.   
 
Developed countries (and some of the larger developing countries) benefit from expert analysis and 
substantive advice from officials in their capitals and also beyond government from academia, 
independent research centres/think tanks, domestic industry groups, and NGOs. In advancing their 
trade policy, the European Commission and USTR use both formal and informal channels to acquire 
advice from a wide spectrum of government agencies as well as from industry and from civil society. 
Diagram 1 and 2 contrast examples of the ‘back up’ support from which EU officials in Geneva 
benefit to that available to an LDC such as Tanzania.  
 
The following indicators highlight the contrast in access to expertise:  
 
  Size of trade policy units: Compared to developing countries, OECD countries generally have a 
far greater number of capital-based staff devoted to trade policy and to assisting Geneva-based 
negotiators.  It is difficult to extract clear numbers from governments regarding the total number 
of staff or resources they dedicate to international trade negotiations.  In some instances, trade 
policy expertise is highly concentrated in one agency (such as Trade or Foreign Affairs) while in 
other instances, the country’s trade policy capacity is spread across a number of agencies. 
Conservative estimates are that the United States and EU each have well over 500 government 
officials dedicated full-time to advancing their respective trade strategies. Tanzania, on the other 
hand, has less than 10 government trade policy staff that it can draw from.  St. Lucia has a 
domestic trade policy unit of just two. Middle income countries tend to have a greater number of 
staff, but still far less than their developed country counter parts.  South Africa has around 15 
dedicated trade policy professionals from across its Ministries devoted to ongoing negotiations 
and Brazil has an estimated 150 staff engaged in ongoing trade policy discussions.  











Diagram 1: Tanzania: Limited Access to ‘back up’ expertise 
Ministry of Trade 
 






















 trade professionals) 
 
Led by DG Trade 















Dialogue with  




National Trade  
Ministries of 
 25 EU Member States 
 
(average of 40 full time 
 trade policy professionals 
 per member) 
 
 
EU Member Trade Reps in Geneva 
 (123) 
EC Trade Reps in Geneva 
(17( 
Diagram 2: European Union: Examples of Access to ‘back up’ 
Notes on EU Policy Process: The European Commission is the negotiator on behalf of 25 Member States. The European 
Council of Ministers is the decisionmaker—the Mandate on which the commission negotiates is determined by the Council 
who then also approves the result of the negotiation. The European Parliament is informed by Commission of trade 
development and gives assent on major treaty ratifications. There is no formal provision for consultation.  The 144 
Committee is a permanent dialogue and sounding board between the Commission and Member States on trade policy 
(consultative role). National trade officials represent the Council on this Committee. The ‘Contact Group’ is comprised of a 
dozen CSO and private sector groups who meet 5-6 times years to advise the DG Trade. COREPER: The Committee of all 
15 permanent representatives in Brussels. The Framework of Delivery is a strategy produced by the TransAtlantic Business 
Dialogue which draws together government and industry groups from the United States and Europe.   13
  Number of think tanks and research centres active on trade policy. The most influential trading 
nations have access to a range of think-tanks and research centres which produce regular in-depth 
reports on negotiation topics and national trade priorities but also on the trading system more 
generally. The United States, for example, benefits from detailed studies by think-tanks such as 
the Institute for International Economics, the Brookings Institution, the Center for Strategic 
International Studies, the RAND Institute and the Heritage Foundation.  It also benefits from a 
series of research units internal to government. Together, these think-tanks generate reports, 
books and studies each year on almost every topic of negotiation, including detailed information 
on domestic interests, foreign trading partners, and trade priorities. Australia provides another 
example—where its leadership of the Cairns Group was supported by the government’s 
investment in trade policy expertise in its dedicated agricultural research think tank—the 
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE). 
 
While no developing country comes close to matching developed country capacities to monitor 
and analyse the interests of their trading partners, they would do well to learn from the example 
of several of the larger developing countries.
18  South Africa, for example, has several specific 
independent research centres devoted to trade economics and law—such as Trade and Industry 
Policy Strategies (TIPS) and the Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (TRALAC). Brazil, India 
and China each also have a cluster of think tanks and economic research centres from which they 
can draw advice in devising their trade policies. Most developing countries, however, are limited 
in domestic sources of advice to small groups of academics informally organized in a university-
based research centre or to a handful of industrial leaders or civil society groups. Geneva-based 
delegates from Egypt and the Philippines, for example, could not name a single think-tank in 
their countries upon which they would call for trade policy advice. A Tanzanian delegate could 
name only two potential domestic sources (the Economic and Social Research Foundation and 
the University of Dar Es Salaam) to which he might turn for trade policy advice—but could not 
name a particular instance in which he had received concrete advice and acknowledged that 
neither potential source offered any particular expertise in trade policy.  
•  Active involvement of domestic lobbies. In preparing for international negotiations, the United 
States and EU benefit from the active efforts of domestic industry and NGO lobbies (see Box 2 
for two illustrations). These lobbies can articulate clear negotiating objectives, provide precise 
data, propose concrete negotiating language and offer advice on negotiating tactics. They also 
supplement government resources by directly lobbying other countries. The EU and United 
States each also have clear processes for harnessing that input (see section on policymaking 
process below). Few developing countries have either industry associations with equally 
sophisticated trade policy agendas or consultation processes that enable them systematically to 
draw on expertise where available. While there are public concerns about excessive private 
sector influence on EU and US trade policymaking—the important point here is simply that the 
success of developed country negotiators is due in part to their access to highly specialized 




                                                 
18  Information regarding domestic research capacity draws from informal discussions with negotiators about the domestic 
sources they can reliably draw on in their negotiations. 
19 NGOs concerned about transparency in the EU and U.S. trade policymaking process have, for example, raised concern 
that industry lobbies exercise too much control over the market for information on which trade decision-making depends; 
they have argued that their governments must also look beyond industry advice to draw on expertise from a broader range of 
interest groups, particularly those with public interest-oriented agendas. In the EU, for example, NGOs have argued for 
greater transparency of the decision-making process, greater opportunities for public and parliamentary input, requirements 
for the disclosure of lobbying activities by major companies and a Code of Conduct for Commissioners which specifies 
limitations on their potential to shift to industry positions after leaving office (Trocaire, 2003; European Commission 2004).   14
 
Box 2. Examples of developed country reliance on industry advice 
 
The United States, trade and intellectual property  
 
The United States boasts a system of some 20 advisory committees charged with supporting the 
development of its international trade strategy. In the area of intellectual property, for example, 
USTR is mandated by Congress to seek advice and input from its Industry Trade Advisory 
Committee on Intellectual Property Rights (ITAC-15).  ITAC-15 has a membership of fifteen 
representatives of US companies and industry associations (see Table 7).   
 
The combined economic weight of several industries represented on ITAC-15 is greater than many 
WTO Member states and translates into a formidable capacity to influence policy debate.  The 
pharmaceutical industry provides a case in point. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers 
Association of America represents more than 100 brand name drug companies and is reported to 
have spent $14.3 million in 2002 on lobbying in the United States. In addition, individual 
pharmaceutical companies spent a combined $91.4 million on lobbying U.S. policymakers to adopt 
their preferences on a range of policy issues—including on the trade front (Oxfam, 2003a). 
Moreover, several industry associations have a capacity for monitoring, research and policy analysis 
that far exceeds that of many developing country missions.  Each year, for example, the 
Biotechnology Industries Association (BIO), PhRMA and the International Intellectual Property 
Alliance (IIPA) submit 20-50 page reports to USTR on the state of play with intellectual property 
legislation and enforcement in over 50 countries, including detailed country studies. 
The European Union, the United States and trade in services 
The services negotiations provide a similar example of the ways in which US and EU officials 
benefit from the substantive and technical support from industry lobbyists and research to help them 
develop and advance their agenda.  
The idea of a services agreement at the WTO was originally advanced—almost 20 years ago—by a 
small group of major US corporations. According to its web-site, the US Coalition of Service 
Industries (CSI), “played a major role in shaping” GATS and the 1997 WTO Telecommunications 
and Financial Services Agreements.  Moreover, it states that “CSI’s ability to use services trade 
negotiations to advance the industries of its members is unmatched”.
 20  Similarly, throughout the 
GATS negotiations, the European Commission’s position has been informed by groups such as the 
European Services Forum (ESF)—a network of representatives from the European services sector 
(see Table 8 for ESF’s membership).  
The ESF directly monitors and provides advice to EU governments—from detailed research 
documents to negotiating proposals. It also lobbies other developed country governments and the 
WTO Secretariat for the liberalisation of services markets through the WTO GATS negotiations. 
Negotiation documents and European Commission papers frequently circulate between industry and 
the Commission (Palast, 2001). In correspondence with the ESF on the GATS negotiations, the 
European Commission affirmed their dependence on industry when it noted that it “would very much 
welcome industry’s input to this exercise, both in terms of finding out where the problems currently 
lie and in making specific requests. Without ESF input the exercise risks becoming a purely 
intellectual one.”
21   
                                                 
20 See home page of the U.S. Coalition of Services Industries (CSI) http://www.ucsci.org/about/  viewed on 30/1//2004. 
21 In its Post-Cancun Trade and Investment Strategy (December 2003), UNICE for example argued that services offers 
tabled by the EU’s trading partners are “highly insufficient” and called on EU negotiators to “continue to press for   15
Few TACB resources are devoted to strengthening the capacity of developing countries to propose 
and defend independent trade policy positions and objectives (Prowse, 2002).  The WTO does 
provide basic trainings—in Geneva and at the regional level—to assist developing country 
policymakers to understand the rules and issues at stake at the WTO.  The WTO is also undertaking 
efforts to build a network of developing country academic centres with capacity to run its basic three-
month trade policy courses in the field. While the WTO may well be the best positioned institution 
for the provision of technical legal advice on the history and content of WTO agreements—it is far 
from clear (even by internal accounts) that it is the best institution to offer any more extensive 
guidance to developing countries regarding the interpretation and implementation of their WTO 
commitments or consolidation of their negotiating positions.  
 
Beyond the rules and technicalities of ongoing negotiations, countries need help to identify their 
specific national interests and priorities in respect of WTO rules and negotiations and to think 
through different scenarios for how best to advance them.  At present, the research, analysis and 
training favoured by donors is often too loosely tailored to be of direct use to particular countries in 
negotiations (Tekere, 2001).  Developing country negotiators report that they are most often provided 
general macro-economic studies whereas they also have a need for industry-specific studies linked to 
practical questions of negotiation (Kostecki, 2001).  
 
Where donors do support focused research initiatives, there is frequently an over-reliance on 
Northern consultants and developed country think-tanks. In the UK, for example, a large proportion 
of DFID funding is channeled through domestic research centres such as the Institute for 
Development Studies (IDS) and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), rather than directly to 
developing country counterparts.  
 
The development of national trade policy capacity requires building long-term institutional capacity 
both within and external to government in developing countries. Yet, trade-related TACB from 
official sources rarely provides systematic support to build durable in-country institutional capacity 
to analyze and inform trade policy issues (ICTSD & IISD, 2003). Developing countries do currently 
have some regional and international think-tanks and NGOs from which they can draw trade policy 
advice—including the European Centre for Development Policy and Management (ECDPM), the 
South Centre, the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), 
International Lawyers and Economists Against Poverty (ILEAP), Third World Network—but such 
organizations rarely have the resources or mandate to get involved in the specific task of analyzing 
specific country sectors and options.  Poorer and smaller countries can sometimes benefit from 
studies by regional centres but these rarely compensate for what might have been gained from a 
domestically-oriented research and capacity.    
 
The Canadian IDRC is one of the few donor institutions which has worked systematically to build 
research capacity and durable institutions in developing countries—including through its support for 
institutions such as TIPS in South Africa and for networks such as the Trade Knowledge Network 
(which fostered collaboration among developed and developing country researchers on issues related 
to trade and sustainable development).  Again, however, some participants in this network have 
complained that it is far easier to acquire donor support for research on topics such as ‘sustainable 
development’ (which match with donor priorities) than to acquire support for their own proposals for 
much-needed analyses of particular domestic trade priorities and options. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
ambitious and significant results in these areas.”  Similarly, the European Services Forum (ESF) has advised the EU that: 
“Trade in services should take centre stage as it has the most to bring to the EU economy. The existing offers are rather 
disappointing... many major emerging countries have still not tabled any initial offers and this needs to be remedied.” 
(European Services Forum, New ESF Priorities for the DDA, 5th November 2003). This high level of ambition was 
subsequently reflected in a communiqué issued by the European Commission three weeks later, “[services’ negotiations] … 
are clearly one of the areas… where the EU has much to gain. Services should therefore be maintained at the top of the 
EU’s negotiating agenda.”   16
The development of local capacity would help foster the articulation of the variety of perspectives 
and informed engagement of national stakeholders—vital to a healthy process of trade policy 
development within a country. To this end, donors should give far greater consideration to actors 
outside government as repositories of long-term capacity from which governments could draw over 
time—beyond the tenure of particular government officials. In providing assistance, the focus should 
be on establishing multi-disciplinary teams, including experts and former negotiators from other 
developing countries, as well as different perspectives on issues.  Ideally, donors would also support 
links between developing country research NGOs, think tanks and academic centres with 
international NGOs and think-tanks active on the issues. Moreover, in approaching the task of 
building research capacity, a key challenge is to ensure a balance between economic research and 
practical policy/legal analysis.  
 
Table 7. Examples of members of the USTR’s ITAC-15 
 
Table 8. Members of European Services Forum (ESF) 
Austria (1)   Italy 
UNIQA Versicherungen AG (www.uniqa.at)   Poste Italiane S.p.A (www.poste.it) 
Belgium (4)   Telecom Italia (www.telecomitalia.it)  
DHL Worldwide Network SA (www.dhl.com)   Netherlands (2)  
Microsoft EMEA (www.microsoft.com)   Royal Ahold NV (www.ahold.com)  
UNICE (www.unice.org)   TPG (TNT Post Group) (www.tntpost.com)  
White & Case LLP. (www.whitecase.com)   Portugal (1)  
France (8)   Portugal Telecom (www.telecom.pt)  
Ernst & Young (www.ey.com)   Spain (2)  
AXA Group (www.axa.com)   Espacio y Entorno SL (www.arqinex.es)  
IBM Europe, Middle East & Africa (www.ibm.com)   Telefónica (www.telefonica.es)  
France Telecom (www.francetelecom.fr)   United Kingdom (16)  
Gide, Lorette, Nouel (www.gide.fr)   Accenture (www.accenture.com)  
La Poste (www.laposte.fr)   Arup & Partners (www.arup.com)  
Veolia Environnement (www.veoliaenvironnement.com)   Barclays PLC (www.barclays.com)  
Germany (7)   British Telecommunications plc - BT 
(www.bt.com)  
ARD (www.ard.de)   Clifford Chance (www.cliffordchance.com)  
Commerzbank AG (www.commerzbank.com)   EDS EMEA (www.eds.com)  
Deutsche Telekom AG (www.deutschetelekom.de)   Herbert Smith (www.herbertsmith.com)  
Metro AG (www.metro.de)   KPMG (www.kpmg.com)  
TUI - Touristik Union International Gmbh - 
(www.tui.com)  
Lloyd's of London (www.lloyds.com)  
SIEMENS AG. (www.siemens.com)   Marks & Spencer plc (www.marks-and-
spencer.co.uk)  
Ed ZÜBLIN A.G. (www.zueblin.de)   mmO2 (www.mmo2.com)  










PhRMA groups some 50 
leading research-based 
pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology companies in 
the United States. 
 
IIPA’s members are the Association of 
American Publishers (AAP), Business 
Software Alliance (BSA), the 
Entertainment Software Association 
(ESA), the Independent Film & 
Television Alliance (I.F.T.A.), the Motion 
Picture Association of America, and the 
Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA)  
 
BIO is a membership 




from around the world. 
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(www.pwcglobal.com/uk)  
National Bank of Greece (www.ethniki.gr)   Prudential Plc. (www.prudential.co.uk)  
  Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) 
(www.royalbankscot.co.uk)  
 UNIVERSAL  MUSIC  Group 
(www.umusic.com)  
 Vodaphone  (www.vodaphone.co.uk)   
 
III. Inadequate domestic trade policymaking processes  
 
A key source of developed country strength in international negotiations is, as alluded to above, 
the existence of a domestic trade policymaking process which enables them to draw on a range 
of domestic expertise—from both government and non-government actors—to formulate their 
trade strategies and monitor compliance of foreign countries with WTO commitments. Most 
developing countries, by contrast, have weak domestic processes for aggregating interests and for 
ensuring that trade policymakers take advantage of available expertise and information. 
 
From a development perspective, the failure to put in place adequate domestic trade policy 
making processes has important distributive consequences. In India and Brazil, for example, civil 
society groups complain that their government’s growing interest in listening to the voice of 
domestic industry groups is yet to be matched by equal attention to non-industry voices such as 
those of rural producers and farmers. Representatives of the poor rural constituencies are, for 
example, rarely invited to participate alongside industry as part of government delegations to 
international trade negotiations. 
 
Moreover, while there is increasing recognition of the importance of participatory trade 
policymaking processes, donors devote few resources to supporting such processes or the 
capacity of particular domestic players to participate therein.  It is often NGOs and private 
philanthropic foundations which pick up the slack—financing the efforts of NGOs and public-
interest research centres to build capacity to engage in trade policy debates and to advocate for 
more participatory domestic trade policymaking processes. 
 
IV. Inadequate support for developing country coalitions 
 
A strategy used by many developing countries to achieve better outcomes in international trade 
negotiations is to form coalitions with other developing countries. Several such coalitions exist, 
including the G90, the G20 and the Caricom Regional Negotiating Machinery.  A central 
challenge to the sustainability and usefulness of such coalitions is the availability of analytical 
back up.  Few active developing country coalitions have the internal research and legal capacity 
necessary to support their efforts to advance a proactive negotiating agenda. In the agricultural 
area, for example, the G20 has the benefit of considerable substantive leadership from Brazil, and 
the contribution of significant analytic support from India. But many other coalitions, such as the 
G90 and the ‘Special Products’ group, fare less successfully in part because they can not rely on 
the same direct access to expertise. Instead, most developing country coalitions depend on ad hoc 
contributions from international agencies, NGOs, government officials and individual 
researchers. 
 
Developing countries have also organized themselves in regional groups such as the African 
Union. Again, however, neither the AU in general or its office in Geneva receive the kind of 
support necessary for them to play an active role in backstopping the various African coalitions 
or African participation in other coalitions. One ongoing resource to which developing country 
governments have access in Geneva is the South Centre—an intergovernmental organization of 
developing countries—which has played an important role in backstopping the work of coalitions 
such as the Like-Minded Group of countries in the lead-up to the Doha Ministerial.  In the past 
year, several developing countries have stepped up their own financial contributions to this 
Centre.   18
 
Only a small handful of bilateral donors have demonstrated a willingness to support developing 
coalitions with a distinct political mission; primarily because their negotiation objectives may be 
at odds with those of powerful donor nations. One exception is the UK’s DFID which has played 
a behind the scenes role in some instances (e.g., in the lead up to the Cancun WTO Ministerial, 
DFID helped Action Aid’s efforts to support the G90 coalition in the agricultural negotiations).   
 
V.  Imbalanced access to justice  
 
WTO Members need to be able to rely on the dispute settlement mechanism to ensure their 
trading partners fulfill negotiated WTO commitments. Effective understanding of, and access to, 
the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures is vital to securing the enforcement and maintenance of 
each WTO Member's rights.  The evidence, however, reveals that the WTO dispute settlement 
process has yet to be of direct use to most of the poorest developing countries.   
 
The United States is the highest user of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement System—bringing a total 
of 76 cases against other WTO Members (see Table 9).  Taken as a group, developing countries 
have been relatively pro-active in dispute settlement, bringing a total of 64 cases against Quad 
countries (whereas the Quad has bought 43 cases against developing countries). (See Table 10 
and Annex 5 for a summary of WTO disputes by major groupings). That said, the group of 
developing countries that has brought disputes to the WTO is very small—with several of the 
same countries involved in multiple disputes. Many other developing countries either abandon or 
never launch dispute settlement proceedings because of the political and financial costs of 
pursuing such action.  Of all the disputes, only one dispute has been brought by an LDC 
(Bangladesh versus India) (see Table 11).  In addition, no African country has made use of the 
dispute settlement mechanism (though four African countries recently joined as third parties in 
the Brazilian cotton case against the United States). 
 
Table 9.  U.S. Participation in the WTO’s dispute settlement system
22 
 
The US is the highest user of the Dispute Settlement 
System bringing 76 cases against other Members 
76 Cases 
Amount of money donated by the US to support the 
Advisory Centre on WTO Law  
0 
 
Table 10. Developed and developing countries in the dispute settlement system
23 
 
Table 11. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism: Little use to the poorest
24 
 
Number of Cases brought by Least Developed Countries against Developed 
Countries 
0 
Number of Cases brought by Least Developed Countries against Developing 
countries  (Bangladesh bought case against India (Ds307) 
1 




                                                 
22 Source: WTO dispute database at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/distabase_wto_members1_e.htm.  Viewed 
at 1/11/04. See also Annex 5 for a summary of WTO disputes by country. 
23 Source: WTO dispute database at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/distabase_wto_members1_e.htm.  Viewed 
at 1/11/04.  See also Annex 5 for a summary of WTO disputes by country. 
24 Source: WTO dispute database at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/distabase_wto_members1_e.htm.  Viewed 
at 1/11/04. See also Annex 5 for a summary of WTO disputes by country.  
Number of cases bought by the Quad against developing countries  43 
Number of cases bought by developing countries against the Quad  64   19
Table 12.  Summary of WTO disputes to date
25 
 
  As plaintiffs 
As defendants 
United 
States EC  Japan  Canada 
European Communities  14  0 7  4 
United States  0  26 1  3 
Japan 6  5 0  1 
Canada 4  3 1  0 
Developed Countries  32  5 0  3 
Developing Countries  20  24 3  2 
Least Developed Countries  0  0 0  0 
        
  As defendants 
As plaintiffs 
United 
States  EC Japan  Canada 
European Communities  26  0 5  7 
United States  0  14 6  12 
Japan 7  1 0  0 
Canada 12  7 0  0 
Developed Countries  17  10 1  1 
Developing Countries  32  30 0  2 
Least Developed Countries  0  0 0  0 
 
* Note that in some instances several countries have joined a dispute, so the numbers do not total exactly.  
 
A range of institutional, financial and political factors constrain developing country use of the 
WTO’s dispute settlement process, including:  
 
  Inadequate human resources and expertise. Few developing countries have the in-house 
technical expertise to cope with the legal complexity of WTO disputes or can afford to 
devote the necessary staff time to this task.   
 
  Inadequate monitoring capacity. Few developing countries have the capacity to monitor the 
international trading environment, identify violations of WTO commitments by other 
Members, or demonstrate impacts on their domestic industries. In part, the acquisition of 
such capacity depends on the sophistication of domestic industry groups and their awareness 
of international trade obligations.  
 
  Inadequate financial resources. The financial cost of disputes/litigation presents a high 
barrier for developing countries. The costs of running a WTO dispute vary considerably—
depending on internal government resources, costs of external legal advice, the length and 
complexity of the dispute, the kind of evidence the country needs to gather and studies it may 
need to commission, and the possibility of re-allocating internal budgetary and staff 
resources to cover a dispute. In some instances, the capacity of a country to take on a case 
depends on the level of interest of a domestic industry group and their willingness to 
contribute toward the legal costs. The minimum cost of leading a WTO dispute was 
estimated by ACWL staff at an average of $1-2 million per case, though costs are often 
higher. 
 
                                                 
25 Source: WTO dispute database at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/distabase_wto_members1_e.htm.  Viewed 
at 1/11/04. See also Annex 5 for a summary of WTO disputes by country.   20
  Fear of consequences. Many developing countries—particularly those most dependent on 
foreign assistance and concessional trade arrangements with more powerful trading 
partners—avoid launching disputes on the grounds that the political risk of irritating major 
trading partners may outweigh any potential benefit of winning a case. 
 
Developing countries have different approaches to running WTO cases. Some countries, such as 
Brazil, use a combination of internal resources and international law firms. While Brazil has 
made an internal commitment also to building its in-house capacity to run disputes, others have 
assessed that they would be better served to rely primarily on international legal advice. India, for 
example, uses the services of the ACWL when involved in disputes. The Philippines relies on a 
combination of internal expertise located in Geneva and the ACWL. In recent years, the 
establishment of several pro-bono services in international law firms for developing countries has 
provided another option for some countries.  Developing countries also often rely on informal 
advice provided by experts in their countries and occasional ad hoc legal support from bilateral 
sources, philanthropic donors, or pro-bono support from NGOs and academics. 
 
One of the few bright spots in the dispute settlement arena was the creation in 2001 of the 
Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) (see Box 3). Established independently of the WTO, the 
ACWL is designed explicitly to help even the playing field for developing countries on the 
assumption that the proper balance of rights and obligations for all Members under the WTO can 
only be maintained if all Members have effective and affordable access to, and an equal 
opportunity to participate in, WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Importantly, neither the 
United States, the EU nor Japan—three of the most powerful trading entities and the highest 
users of the dispute settlement system—is a Member of the ACWL.  Nor, to date, have any of 
these three made a financial contribution to the ACWL (see Table 13).  Indeed, the European 
Commission opposed and originally tried to block the establishment of the Centre (even though 
several EU countries are ACWL Members) (SEATINI, 2001). 
 
While the ACWL represents an important attempt to address the financial impediments to 
developing countries participation in dispute settlement proceedings, it far from addresses the 
range of problems that constrain the ability of developing countries, and particularly LDCs, to 
realize the potential benefits of their membership of the dispute settlement system.  Still 
unaddressed are the challenges developing countries face in terms of knowing when their rights 
are being violated by other countries. Most importantly, the fact that no LDC has mounted a case 
against a developed country, despite the ACWL’s offer of discounted legal advice, provides a 
strong indication that legal aid does not and perhaps can not address the over-riding structural 
problems of political risks and consequences (Annex 6 provides a summary of the cases for 
which developing countries have sought ACWL advice). 
 
 
Box 3. The Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) 
 
Co-owned and administered by its Member States (see Table 10), the Advisory Centre on WTO Law 
provides the following services to developing countries, and in particular the least developed among them:  
 
  Legal advice on WTO law 
  Support to parties and third parties in WTO dispute settlement proceedings 
  Training of government officials in WTO law through seminars and traineeships 
 
For cases where the ACWL is unable to provides support through its own lawyers due to a conflict of 
interest, it relies on a roster of law firms and individuals who have registered their ability to provide 
external legal counsel services to least developed countries and to members of ACWL. These include 
Baker & McKenzie, Clyde & Co., King & Spalding, O'Connor and Company, Sidley Austin Brown & 
Wood LLP, Thomas and Partners, Vermulst Waer & Verhaeghe, and White & Case. 
The ACWL is funded through an Endowment Fund and Legal Fees.     21
 
•  Endowment Fund: Members from developing countries, separate customs territories or economies in 
transition pay a one-time financial contribution (in accordance with their capacity to pay) to the 
Endowment Fund.
26 Least developed countries are not required to make such payments to enjoy all the 
benefits. Each of the developed country members of the Centre – Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom - has contributed US $1,000,000 or 
more to the Endowment Fund and/or committed to pay at least US $1,250,000 in multiyear 
contributions to finance expenditures in the first five years of operations.  
 
•  General legal advice: Free for Members and all least developed countries up to a maximum number of 
hours. For developing countries that are not ACWL Members the hourly rate varies between CHF405 
(US$250) and CHF567 (US$350), depending on their share of world trade and per capita income. 
 
•  Support in WTO dispute settlement proceedings: Fees for ACWL Members for legal services in WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings range from CHF 162 to CHF 324 per hour depending on the countries 
share of world trade and per capita income. Least developed countries pay CHF 40 per hour. The 
hourly fees charged by the ACWL for its support in dispute settlement proceedings are based on a 
time budget adopted by the Management Board.  
 
 
Table 13.  ACWL Members  
 
Signatories Signatories  Non-Signatories   
(by accession) 
Canada  Hong Kong, China  Jordan 
Denmark India  Mauritius 
Finland Kenya  Oman 
Ireland Latvia  Turkey 
Italy Nicaragua  El  Salvador 
Netherlands Pakistan  Chinese  Taipei 
Norway Panama  Indonesia  (March  2004) 
Sweden Paraguay   
United Kingdom  Peru  In process of ratification 
 Philippines  Switzerland 
Colombia Thailand   
Dominican Republic  Tunisia   
Ecuador Uruguay   
Egypt Venezuela   
Guatemala    





CONCLUSION AND REFORM PROPOSALS 
 
Too little TACB is directed toward building developing country capacity in the area of trade 
policy, negotiations and regulation. Where assistance is provided, it too often reflects donor 
priorities rather than the needs of particular countries. While sometimes well-intentioned, 
discussion on TACB reform frequently amounts to a bureaucratically-driven ‘tinkering’ around 
the edges.  Rarely does assistance reflect a true commitment to confronting and addressing the 
failure of TACB to provide fundamental assistance to countries where—politically—they need it 
most.  This paper has thus argued that there is an urgent need to shift TACB from the symbolic 
                                                 
26 Developing country contributions vary with the share of world trade and income per capita, and range from 81,000 to 
486,000 Swiss francs per year.   22
realm to focus on what ought to be the real goal: helping developing countries bolster their 
relative power in the world trading system.  
 
I.  Build a more independent system for the design and provision of TACB 
 
It is now commonplace for donors to argue that developing countries should lead the design, 
orientation, focus and implementation of TACB (OECD, 2001 & 2003; UNDP, 2002).  But 
ongoing efforts to improve the effectiveness of TACB rarely get to the heart of the problem—the 
supply-driven nature of most TACB.  Instead of gearing assistance towards priorities identified 
by donors, such as on straightforward compliance with WTO agreements, developing countries 
should be able to receive advice regarding prospective WTO-related reforms and options from 
independent sources. The challenge is not to continue reiterating old reform proposals but to 
refocus attention on thinking through mechanisms and approaches which will help:  
 
  de-link TACB  from donor economic priorities,  
  insulate TACB from political pressures and bias, 
  put developing countries in the drivers’ seat, 
  increase available financial resources, 
  reduce bureaucratic constraints on tailoring assistance to meet country needs, and 
  build developing country power in the trading system. 
 
Advancing this agenda requires that donors think ‘outside the box’ about solutions.  A 
commitment among donors to a more institutionally ‘independent’ approach to TACB could be 
one way of achieving this end while also improving the stability, predictability and more rapid 
dispersion of TACB funding. A more independent and ‘competitive’ approach to TACB could, 
for example, stimulate a greater focus on long-term local capacity, draw on the diversity of local 
expertise and stakeholders, better match independent international expertise with national needs, 
and ensure greater tailoring of legal and policy advice to development objectives.  
 
One possible approach would be to establish a new facility for TACB within existing 
institutions—one which enables TACB to be devised and implemented at arms’ length from the 
influence of particular donors. Models for similarly ‘insulated’ units within multilateral 
organizations from which lessons might be learned include the Operations and Evaluations 
Department and the Inspection Panel at the World Bank. 
 
Alternatively, donors and recipients could fulfil their legal commitments to TACB by 
channelling resources through mechanisms outside existing institutional structures in ways that 
separate financing from the actual management and use of TACB resources. One option is the 
creation of an independently-administered and independently-governed ‘fund’ external to any 
current agency (building on, for example, the model of the Global Environmental Facility for 
TACB related to key international environmental agreements or the Advisory Centre for WTO 
Law). WTO Members would be asked to re-channel and increase their existing support for 
TACB in the area of negotiations and implementation to this fund. Amongst other advantages, 
this would mean a reduction in the amount of TACB administered bilaterally and that the WTO 
Secretariat’s role in technical assistance would be focused on its area of comparative 
advantage—basic technical education about WTO Agreements—leaving advice on interpretation 
and implementation of rules to other sources.  
 
Developing countries (or groups thereof) could approach the Fund for independent advice related 
to negotiations and implementation.  Annual contributions could be made on the basis of a 
percentage of exports for rich and middle-income countries with a weighted transfer in favor of 
the poorest/smallest countries.  This arrangement would put greater power in the hands of 
developing countries to specify particular needs, match developing country requests with 
appropriate technical assistance from a range of possible sources, and enable competitive 
selection of the providers that offers the most attractive proposal for meeting those needs.    23
Countries could, for example, choose then to ‘hire’ particular providers (whether NGOs, IGOs, 
institutions, experts, academics, or the WTO secretariat) listed on a roster of interested and 
available TA providers who would bid to provide particular kinds of assistance.  
Such an institution could be governed by an independent Board of experts nominated by donors 
and recipients. While it is not the focus of this paper, such an independent structure could also be 
used to manage a wider-range of trade-related assistance, including TACB to build capacity for 
trade. 
 
II.  Support stronger developing country representation in Geneva. 
 
The future strength and legitimacy of the multilateral trading system will depend critically on 
measures to close some of its more glaring democratic deficits. As noted above, many 
developing countries are prevented from maintaining adequate missions at the WTO by cost. A 
step in the right direction would be to add a levy to the regular budgetary contributions of the 
most powerful WTO Members earmarked specifically to make real the membership of the 
poorest countries by expanding their representation in Geneva.  
 
III.   Support long-term independent sources of expertise and back-up in capitals 
 
Donors should diversify the number of suppliers and recipients of assistance; they should 
prioritize organizations that have the greatest potential to provide independent and responsive 
advice unencumbered by bureaucratic constraints and donor-driven strategic agendas.  By 
harnessing and strengthening a broader range of local and regional research university hubs, 
private sector consultants, think-tanks, and non-governmental organizations in developing 
countries, the durability and long-term cost-effectiveness of TACB will be enhanced (ICTSD & 
IISD, 2003; Reality of Aid Network, 2004: 17). 
 
IV.  Implement professional standards for technical assistance  
 
To help improve the quality of technical assistance, developing countries should be empowered 
to veto the donor’s choice of technical assistance provider. Moreover, developing countries need 
access to experts to review the proposed style and format of technical assistance to ensure that it 
is delivered in a way that maximises its effectiveness and usefulness. Resources should not, for 
example, be squandered on research which is not properly targeted or presented in ways that best 
meet countries’ needs.   
 
Countries could agree to develop a set of guidelines and a professional certification scheme or 
code of ethics for providers of technical/legal assistance and policy advice to developing 
countries. These should include strong requirements for disclosure to developing country 
recipients of the professional background of consultants and any potential conflicts of interest, as 
well as principles of professional responsibility. The duty should be on the provider to make 
known to clients their positions, expertise and relationships with other relevant organisations. 
Requirements on donor agencies to make transparent their roster of consultants and providers 
would help aid transparency in this respect.  These measures should, in turn, be combined with 
the broader professional concept of the “duty to refer” where providers should be called on to 
acknowledge their institutional limitations or lack of knowledge or local expertise that impede 







                                                 
27 This proposal is elaborated in Musungu (2003) and Deere (2005) with respect to TACB in the area of intellectual 
property and trade.   24
V.  Improve support for mainstreaming trade policy reforms into broader development 
and poverty reduction strategies 
 
Trade-related TACB must not be seen simply as a tool through which to achieve compliance with 
WTO rules or to reduce the resistance of developing countries to new WTO disciplines.  Instead, 
it should focus on enabling countries to assess the complex role of international trade in their 
national development strategies and to weigh the pros and cons of different options.  This means 
supporting a domestic policymaking process that helps countries place WTO commitments in the 
context of broader national development strategies.  
 
Support for policy analysis, research and advice must be designed in ways that developing 
countries acquire advice on a range of different policy options and implications.
28 Greater 
emphasis should be placed on helping countries devise estimates of the implementation cost of 
new WTO commitments to national budgets, identify their needs for assistance, assess the 
appropriate transition and sequencing of policy reform to meet WTO obligations, monitor the 
social and economic impacts of the implementation of new trade policies, and develop 
appropriate responses.  
 
The mainstreaming of trade into development strategies will also rely on institution-building at 
the national level, particular in respect of the effective coordination of trade policymaking and 
implementation.  Developing countries should also agree to commit to building the capacity not 
only of their economic and trade ministries, but also to promote more effective inter-agency 
coordination of trade policy and permanent processes for consultation with necessary 
stakeholders in business, NGOs, academia and trade unions.  
 
VI. Cost of compliance audit 
 
The impacts on developing country budgets of the implementing new WTO agreements should 
be properly assessed. In most instances, the costs to developing countries of building the 
institutional and human resource capacities to meet WTO commitments exceed what their 
budgets or aid can realistically meet and risk the diversion of precious resources from other 
national priorities. A “cooling off” period should be incorporated into trade negotiation processes 
during which an assessment of the budgetary cost of implementation for developing countries of 
proposed commitments is conducted (in addition to other assessments of development, social and 
environmental implications of the agreements). This mechanism would help all parties ensure 
that they are fully aware of the implications of the deals and trade-offs made in negotiations and 
that these remain within the scope of what they can realistically achieve. 
 
VII.   Improve monitoring and independent evaluation 
 
Working in collaboration, donor and recipient countries need to improve mechanisms for 
monitoring and evaluation of trade-related TACB.  In addition to existing efforts to reduce 
duplication and minimize reporting requirements (and other administrative procedures which 
stretch the absorptive capacity of developing countries), there is a need for indicators of 
effectiveness, comparative analyses of the impact of TACB, and guidelines regarding good 
practices in the design and implementation of assistance. In so doing, the focus should be not just 
on the technical implementation of a particular project but also on its overall contribution to the 
                                                 
28 At least two recent conferences have explicitly addressed questions of how TACB can help improve the quality of 
research and research capacity in developing countries. For a summary of the discussions at a March 2001 IDRC 
meeting entitled “Trade Policies in Developing Countries: What Role for Capacity Building and Research?” (see 
Joekes & Medhora, 2001). A second conference “International Layers and Economists Against Poverty (ILEAP): 
Launch of a New Initiative”, held in Nairobi from May 4-6 2002, featured several papers which reviewed developing 
countries needs and experience with Technical Assistance and Capacity Building in Trade & Trade-Related Law & 
Policy. See www.ileapinitiative.com.   25
ultimate goals of ensuring that countries put in place trade policies, institutions, and initiatives 
that advance their development.   
 
Several measures should be taken to institutionalise ongoing processes of monitoring and 
evaluation and to ensure that lessons learned translate into improved practice. A rolling 
programme of external TACB impact evaluations should be undertaken, published and actively 
made available to developing countries, with the results openly discussed among donors and 
beneficiaries. Proposals for independent ex-poste and ex-ante peer reviews of trade-related 
TACB should also be taken up. In addition, an independent review panel should be established to 
which developing countries could turn for feedback on the potential usefulness of a proposed 
technical assistance package and suggestions for improvements. Finally, governments should 
strengthen the use of the WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism to monitor developed country 
actions to meet their obligations to provide trade-related TACB.  
 
Importantly, the potential and success of each of these recommendations will rest upon 
developing country efforts to push for more effective TACB and to make it work for them. 
Developing countries need to exercise stronger national leadership to articulate TACB needs and 
extract the most value out of available TACB resources.    26
  
 
Annex 1.   Summary of Multilateral TACB Initiatives 
 
Joint Integrated Trade Assistance Programme (JITAP) 
 
The JITAP was developed jointly by the WTO, the ITC and UNCTAD to provide technical 
assistance to African countries.
29 Established in 1998, its objectives include: 
  to build national capacity to understand the multilateral trading system 
  to adapt the national trading system of targeted countries to the obligations and conditions of 
the multilateral trading system, and  
  to help countries enhance readiness of their exports to participate in the trading system so as 
to enable them to reap the benefits of trade. 
 
The JITAP began by providing capacity-building to eight African country partners to the end of 
2002 (Benin, Burkina-Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Tunisia, Uganda, and the United 
Republic of Tanzania—four of which are LDCs). A second phase of JITAP was launched in 
early 2003, adding an additional eight countries (Botswana, Cameroon, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Senegal and Zambia) and proposing greater attention to needs arising 
from other TACB programmes in Africa, such as the NEPAD, the Cotonou Agreement and the 
Integrated Framework. Thirteen donors are contributing to the funding of the programme, 
currently amounting to US$10 million.  The Programme is funded through a Common Trust 
Fund (CTF) supported by a number of donor countries. The CTF is composed of two windows: 
Window I, where funds are contributed by donors to support programme development activities 
in countries facing shortage of resources; and Window II, where contributions are ear-marked for 
specific countries.  The activities are only implemented when the resources are made available in 
cash to the three executing organizations. Most partner countries have contributed to the 
programme activities in the form of counterpart funding. 
 
Key recommendations for improvement of the JITAP have included increased financing, greater 
support for the development of capacities at the national level to discuss and elaborate on 
multilateral trading system issues, stronger emphasis on building human resource capacities 
through the engagement of local institutions, and a deeper focus on supply-side issues to expand 
export opportunities (de Silva & Weston, 2002).  
 
The Integrated Framework 
 
The Integrated Framework (IF)—a programme jointly managed by the WTO, UNCTAD, the 
World Bank, the IMF, the International Trade Centre, and the UNDP—was launched in 1997 to 
help maximize the effectiveness of the resources used to help least-developed and other low-
income countries respond to trade challenges and needs in the context of broader development 
strategies and policies.
30  By providing more coherent trade-related technical assistance, the IF 
aims to assist in integrating trade issues into national development strategies.
31   
 
In the face of lack of coordination, the IF aims to coordinate the responses of the various 
agencies and development partners (each in their own sphere of competence) to the TACB needs 
identified by each of the LDC governments and national stakeholders.   
 
                                                 
29 See http://www.jitap.org and JITAP (2004). 
30 The IF is convened by a Working Group (responsible for management) which includes 10 members—two of which 
are LDCs— and a Steering Committee (which provides overall policy direction and includes representatives from 
agencies, donors and LDCs). 
31 For further information on the Integrated Framework, see www.integratedframework.org   27
The first step toward receiving support through the IF is the Diagnostic Trade Integration Study 
(DTIS).  These studies identify supply-side constraints, the sectors of greatest export potential 
and recommend appropriate plan of action including policy reforms, technical assistance 
priorities, and institutional capacity needs. This Plan of Action is then to be integrated into a 
country’s national development plan (such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Process (PRSP)) 
and subsequently implemented in partnership with the development cooperation community.   
 
The IF Trust Fund (created in 2001) has two funding instruments which rely on voluntary 
contributions from bilateral and multilateral donors: Window I (which finances preparation of the 
Diagnostic Study) and Window II (which provides bridging money for small assistance or 
capacity-building activities that are part of the DTIS matrix).  Funding of the implementation 
Action Plans relies primarily on bilateral donors as part of their overall responses to national 
poverty reduction strategies. 
 
While the IF has recently launched a revised second phase, several recent reviews have 
highlighted a number of ongoing factors limiting the effectiveness of the IF (Rajapartirana et al, 
2000; Hormeku, 2003: 4; Prowse, 2002).  These include:  
  the conflicting mandates of the agencies involved,  
  emphasis on technical assistance over direct aid and infrastructure, 
  disorganization and confusion about which agency to approach for which kind of assistance, 
  inadequate resources,  
  weak transparency of implementation, particularly in respect of the selection and criteria for 
the selection of beneficiary countries,  
  inadequate focus on primary commodity dependence and other factors important to the trade 
of LDCs, and 
  inadequate developing country leadership or scope for leadership in the preparation of the 
diagnostic studies. 
 
WTO Technical Assistance 
 
Since Doha, the WTO has sought to play a more prominent role in the delivery and design of 
TACB. In Doha, the WTO Members endorsed a New Strategy for WTO Technical Cooperation 
for Capacity Building, Growth and Integration. To ensure long-term funding of the WTO’s 
technical assistance activities, a Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund (GTF) was 
established in 2001, which relies on voluntary contributions from Members. It received pledges 
of around US$15.7 million in 2002 (more than double the amount anticipated) enabling the WTO 
to undertake an unprecedented level of activity.  
 
According to the WTO’s 2003 technical assistance and capacity building work program, the 
main activities it pursues are trade policy courses, the development of new training tools, short-
term trade policy courses, distance learning services, internships, “legal clinics”, and three month 
trade policy courses in and outside Geneva.  The substantive focus of WTO assistance is 
generally in three areas: rules implementation, utilization of the system, and enhancing the ability 
of Members to follow negotiations.   
 
There are contrasting views on the quality of WTO assistance and the extent to which the WTO 
Secretariat should have a role in the provision of TACB.  While the creation of the GTF 
represents a positive effort to address earlier criticism that the WTO’s TACB had been open-
ended, short-term, contingent and too often earmarked for particular purposes, not all Member 
States agree that capacity-building by the WTO Secretariat is the appropriate focus for 
expansion.  
 
In terms of design, WTO assistance has been criticized for an overly formulaic, top-down 
approach. Common complaints are that too few resources move beyond the provision of one-off   28
seminars and trainings for a limited number of officials, and that too little systematic attention is 
paid to tailoring WTO assistance to the particular circumstances and strategic needs of countries. 
 
The substantive focus of WTO TACB also attracts considerable informal complaints from 
developing countries. In advising countries how to comply with WTO commitments, the 
Secretariat has been criticized for offering narrow interpretations of the flexibilities and options 
countries have in respect of the implementation of their WTO obligations. As developed 
countries continue to work to push new issues onto the WTO negotiating agenda, there have also 
been concerns that the limited absorptive capacity of developing countries is too often consumed 
by TACB programmes which focus on issues of primary interests to donors and not recipients.  
 
Recent efforts to improve the long-term impact of WTO assistance include foreign partnerships 
with developing country academic centres in the provision of WTO training courses; forging 
joint research projects; shifting the focus of trainings toward the regional level; establishing 6 
month internships at the WTO for developing country doctoral students; and increasing the 
amount of WTO training which is out-sourced to contacts in the field. In informal conversation, 
several WTO Secretariat staff acknowledged that the selection of consultants and partners is 





UNCTAD has been providing assistance to developing countries in the area of trade negotiations 
since the GATT Tokyo Round: its mandate on "trade and development" has always included 
support for the effective participation of the developing countries in multilateral trade 
negotiations. At UNCTAD IX (Midrand, 1996) and UNCTAD X (Bangkok, 2000), this mandate 
was strengthened in view of the establishment of the WTO with the launching of two UNCTAD 
technical assistance instruments: the "Positive Agenda" and the Commercial Diplomacy 
Programmes. The mandate to provide support to regional trade agreements among developing 
countries was also strengthened. In February 2002, UNCTAD´s Secretary-General announced a 
"post-Doha technical assistance and capacity building plan" based on specific requests made to 
the UNCTAD secretariat by the developing countries.  
As a standing program of the UN, UNCTAD derives its core income from the UN headquarters.  
Any special programmes are funded from extra-budgetary contributions (the main contributors to 
which are the EU, Norway and Switzerland with the US making no extra-budgetary 
commitments). 
Many developing countries and civil society groups hope to strengthen UNCTAD’s role in 
TACB relative to that of the WTO. For these constituencies, UNCTAD is the most favoured of 
the international agencies involved in trade and development because it is considered to be the 
agency most reliably focused on the concerns of developing countries. They have noted with 
concern the shift of donor resources away from UNCTAD and toward the WTO’s “development” 
program (despite the WTO’s limited capacities on this front) and the World Bank. That said, 
there have also been concerns expressed about the efficiency and limitations of UNCTAD’s 
technical assistance—from both developing and developed countries.  Complaints from the 
developing country perspective have included disappointment with the bureaucratic approach to 
providing assistance and the difficulties in offering dynamic solutions to particular problems or 
negotiating issues that arise. UNCTAD’s ability to be flexible and to tailor assistance to 
particular countries is constrained by the political processes necessary to build consensus on the 
appropriate orientation of assistance and research, and the need not to work in favour of any 
particular country to the disadvantage of others (Patel, 2002).  
                                                 
32 The source for this information is the UNCTAD website, www.unctad.org    29
On the other hand, the United States has long expressed reservations about the political and 
substantive focus of UNCTAD’s work. Concerned that UNCTAD’s work bolsters a more 
difficult and combative climate for trade negotiations, the United States has argued that 
UNCTAD ought to confine itself to a tightly-defined research and analysis role, with only a 
limited technical assistance and capacity building function.  
The IMF and the Trade Integration Mechanism (TIM) 
The IMF, working with the World Bank, works to address the issue of the availability of 
adequate trade financing for developing countries, particularly in times of financial crisis. In 
early 2004, the IMF introduced a new policy—the Trade Integration Mechanism—to help 
reassure low income developing countries that they will receive assistance from the international 
community to deal with adjustment difficulties they encounter from the loss of trade preferences 
likely to result from any lowering of most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs in the Doha Round.  
That is, the TIM makes funds available only for countries which suffer damages as a result of 
others' liberalisation (i.e., where countries could lose preferential market access or the benefit of 
subsidised agricultural products).   
Since its announcement, the TIM has provoked a variety of responses.  While few argue against 
the concept of the TIM, and many welcome it as a useful step forward, a number of developing 
country members argue that the TIM’s focus on balance of payment problems is too limited as it 
is restricted to damages inflicted by changes in the multilateral regime. Questions have also 
arisen as to the methodology used for calculating damages caused to a country by others’ 
liberalization, the potential use of conditionalities, and the fact that assistance will come in the 
form of loans—not grants—which could add to the existing debt burden of countries. Some 
NGOs have offered a broader critique of the TIM arguing that its real purpose is simply to 
neutralize or delegitimise developing countries concerns about the adjustment costs of further 
liberalisation, serving in reality as a new “insurance policy” to entice developing countries back 
to the multilateral trade negotiation table (Powell, 2004).    
The World Bank 
 
The World Bank has significantly stepped up its support to trade activities in recent years— 
augmenting resources and staff, and establishing a new Trade Department in 2002 to coordinate 
its trade-related policy, research and capacity-building.  These activities include: trade lending 
operations, support for domestic policy reform, institutional building, training of government 
officials and researchers to formulate policy, undertaking analytical work and research, 
participate in the preparation of the Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies in the context of the IF 
(and leading the IF Steering Committee), contributing to the IF Trust Fund, and assisting 
developing countries to meet product standards.
33 In the latter area, the Bank is implementing 
trade facilitation projects to improve quality standards in developing countries.  The World Bank 
also leads the Standards and Trade Development Facility—an inter-agency partnership with the 
WTO, FAO and WHO—which will deliver technical assistance for food safety and related 
standards. The Bank’s activities in trade-lending include adjustment lending to support trade 
reforms, loans for export development, insurance schemes, and loans for trade financing 
(primarily lines of credited to private sector exporters and importers in developing countries).  
Finally, the Bank’s lending also includes loans for strengthening institutions (such as physical 
infrastructure and building capacity in customs administration). 
                                                 
33 The recognition of international standards in the WTO opens the prospect of disputes against those countries that do 
not comply (where as formerly international standard-setting organizations only set voluntary guidelines). The needs in 
this area are numerous, including support to meet the costs of the implementation requirements of the TBT and SPS 
agreements (which can amount to an entire year’s development assistance budget in some least developed countries), 
support in compliance and meeting the costs of establishing and maintaining certification facilities, and support for 
developing country representation in international standard-setting organizations.   30
 
The diversity of the Bank’s activities in trade limit the usefulness of any general observations 
about the lessons and/or limitations about their effectiveness. Suffice to say that suggestions have 
been offered from the academic and NGO community about a broad range of these activities.
34  
A common theme of these contributions is a concern that the World Bank’s activities embody a 
bias toward particular kinds of economic policy advice (e.g., a prima facie preference for 
unilateral liberalization) and that the expansion of the World Bank’s activities and the substantial 
resources it can bring to bear may crowd out attention to alternative economic proposals and the 
role of agencies with deeper experience on trade/development issues (e.g., UNCTAD). 
 
Critics have also raised questions about how much of a role the World Bank should play in 
improving the mainstreaming trade into PRSPs via the IF.  On the one hand, there are concerns 
that the PRSP processes themselves have limitations (UNDP, 2001). While efforts are ongoing to 
improve the quality of PRSPs, the effort to employ multi-stakeholder strategies in their 
development has been partial at best. On the other hand, there are concerns that the Bank pursues 
a formulaic commitment to advocating aggressive trade liberalization measures, even for the 
most vulnerable countries (Powell, 2002).  Critics suggest that the World Bank’s role should be 
restricted to providing loans or grants to fund initiatives identified in TACB assessments, leaving 
developing countries themselves to be in the lead on diagnostic studies with the assistance of 
other relevant international organizations and non-State actors (Powell, 2002).  Importantly, 
while World Bank critics raise questions about the Bank’s ideas about the nature of a “good” 
trade policy, it is important also to note that the interests of bilateral donors may also simply be 




                                                 
34 See, for example, Bretton Woods Project (2002), Ladd, (2003), Reality of Aid Network (2003), Rowden (2001), and 
Tan (2002).   31
 
Annex 2.   Trade negotiators representing EU Member interests in Geneva
35 
 
The EU fields 1 negotiator per every 3.33 million of its people. 
 
   Negotiators  Population 
HDI 
Rank  GDP Status 
Austria 5  8.1  14  204.1  Developed 
Belgium 8  10.3  6  245.4  Developed 
Denmark 5  17  17  172.9  Developed 
France 6  59.8  16  1,431.30  Developed 
Finland 5  5.2  13  131.5  Developed 
Germany 9  82.4  19  1,984.10  Developed 
Greece 7  11  24  132.8  Developed 
Ireland 4  4.4  10  121.40  Developed 
Italy 5  57.5  21  1,184.30  Developed 
Luxembourg 2  0.4  15  21.00  Developed 
Netherlands 6  16.8  5  417.90  Developed 
Portugal 4  10  26  121.60  Developed 
Spain 11  41  20  653.10  Developed 
Sweden 4  9  2  240.30  Developed 
United Kingdom  9  59.1  12  1,566.30  Developed 
Cyprus 3  0.8  30  10.10  Developing 
Czech Republic  4  10.2  32  69.50  Developed 
Estonia 5  1.3  36  6.50  Developing 
Hungary 4  9.9  38  65.80  Developed 
Latvia 2  2.3  50  8.40  Developing 
Lithuania 2  3.5  41  13.80  Developing 
Malta 3  0.4  31  3.90  Developing 
Poland 4  38.6  37  189.00  Developed 
Slovak Republic  3  5.4  42  23.70  Developing 
Slovenia 3  2  27  22.00  Developing 
General EC*  17             
                 
Totals 140  466.4      9,040.70     
 
* Note that this figure includes both professional staff of the Permanent Delegation of the European 
Commission to Geneva and also the staff of the Office of Liaison of the General Secretariat of the 
Council of the European Union.   
                                                 
35 Data in this table were drawn from the 2002 WTO Directory , the latest official directory published by the WTO.   32
Annex 3.  Trade negotiators per Mission in Geneva
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Unites States of America  16  329.7  20.61  8  25,259,391 
Germany 9  82.4  9.16  19  14,250,795 
Japan 22  127.2  5.78  9  10,261,866 
United Kingdom  9  59.1  6.57  12  9,116,628 
France 6  59.8  9.97  16  8,354,347 
Italy 5  57.5  11.50  21  6,663,198 
Canada 11  31.3  2.85  4  6,315,258 
Netherlands 5  16.8  2.80  5  5,487,774 
China 11  1,294.90  117.72  94  5,228,175 
Hong Kong, China  7  7  1.00  23  5,121,415 
Belgium 8  10.3  1.29  6  4,300,878 
Korea, Republic of  18  47.4  2.63  28  3,870,942 
Spain 11  41  3.73  20  3,867,884 
Mexico 9  102  11.33  53  3,580,334 
Singapore 7  4.2  0.60  25  3,242,936 
Chinese Taipei  14     0.00     3,210,565 
Switzerland 8  7.2  0.90  11  2,344,679 
Sweden 4  9  2.25  2  2,238,521 
Austria 5  8.1  1.62  14  2,205,079 
Malaysia 4  24  6.00  59  2,086,784 
Australia 9  19.5  2.17  3  1,849,231 
Ireland 4  4.4  1.10  10  1,841,263 
Thailand 13  62.2  4.78  76  1,588,231 
Denmark 5  17  3.40  17  1,529,119 
Brazil 12  176.3  14.69  72  1,524,478 
Norway 8  4.5  0.56  1  1,370,419 
Indonesia 8  217.1  27.14  111  1,300,828 
India 7  1049.5  149.93  127  1,282,088 
Turkey 12  70.3  5.86  88  1,187,374 
Poland 4  38.6  9.65  37  1,123,706 
Finland 5  5.2  1.04  13  1,017,574 
Portugal 4  10  2.50  26  909,903 
Israel 4  6.3  1.58  22  902,768 
Philippines 8  78.6  9.83  83  902,343 
United Arab Emirates  2  2.9  1.45  49  839,051 
Czech Republic  4  10.2  2.55  32  817,258 
South Africa  4  44.8  11.20  119  783,254 
Argentina 9  38  4.22  35  741,787 
Hungary 4  9.9  2.48  38  685,063 
Greece 7  11  1.57  24  656,188 
                                                 
36 Data in this table were drawn from the WTO Directory, most recently published in September 2002 by the WTO 
Secretariat. Some figures were updated based on personal conversations with staff in Missions. The figures here refer 
only to professional staff tasked with substantive engagement on trade policy issues (not administrative, financial or 
secretarial staff).   33
Luxembourg 2  0.4  0.20  15  549,865 
Venezuela 7  25.2  3.60  68  523,426 
Chile 5  15.6  3.12  43  498,958 
Egypt 11  70.5  6.41  120  413,461 
New Zealand  5  3.8  0.76  18  400,664 
Colombia 5  43.5  8.70  73  351,620 
Kuwait 2  2.4  1.20  44  314,698 
Nigeria 8  120.9  12.09  151  306,670 
Slovak Republic  3  5.4  1.80  42  306,166 
Romania 4  22.4  5.60  69  282,094 
Slovenia 3  2  0.67  27  254,823 
Pakistan 5  149.9  29.98  142  251,867 
Morocco 5  30.1  6.02  125  248,615 
Croatia 2  4.4  2.20  48  221,297 
Peru 9  26.8  2.98  85  208,728 
Tunisia 3  9.7  3.23  92  206,769 
Dominican Republic  4  8.6  1.72  98  200,700 
Panama 3  3.1  1.03  61  184,416 
Oman 2  2.8  1.40  74  177,983 
Bangladesh  5  143.8  28.76  138  168,545 
Costa Rica  4  4.1  1.03  45  161,896 
Bulgaria 2  8  4.00  56  155,698 
Sri Lanka  2  18.9  9.45  96  149,221 
Ecuador 9  12.8  1.42  100  131,458 
Lithuania 2  3.5  1.75  41  129,848 
Angola  4  13.2  3.30  166  128,345 
Bahrain 4  0.7  0.18  40  117,049 
Qatar 4  0.6  0.15  47  112,392 
Jordan 3  5.3  1.77  90  102,660 
Macao, China  6     0.00     102,580 
Estonia 5  1.3  0.26  36  102,566 
Cuba 5  11.3  2.26  52  102,558 
Cote d'Ivoire  5  16.4  3.28  163  101,153 
Guatemala 6  12  2.00  121  101,001 
Cyprus 3  0.8  0.27  30  97,792 
El Salvador  5  6.4  1.28  103  96,231 
Uruguay 8  3.4  0.43  46  91,518 
Jamaica 3  2.6  0.87  79  88,242 
Paraguay 6  5.7  0.95  89  81,886 
Latvia 2  2.3  1.15  50  80,133 
Malta 3  0.4  0.13  31  75,323 
Kenya 3  31.5  10.50  148  72,143 
Zimbabwe 5  12.8  2.56  147  70,577 
Iceland 3  0.3  0.10  7  68,903 
Brunei Darussalam  5  0.3  0.06  33  65,720 
Trinidad and Tobago  5  1.3  0.26  54  64,177 
Ghana 3  20.5  6.83  131  61,013 
Mauritius 7  1.2  0.17  64  62,497 
Honduras 5  6.8  1.36  115  60,916 
Gabon 4  1.3  0.33  122  56,196 
Botswana 4  1.8  0.36  128  56,112 
Myanmar  4  48.9  12.23  133  52,916   34
Papua New Guinea  0  5.6  0.00  126  48,105 
Namibia 0  2  0.00  114  43,304 
Cameroon 2  15.7  7.85      41,662 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia              40,140 
Bolivia 3  8.6  2.87  141  40,071 
Liechtenstein  4     0.00     40,057 
Tanzania  3  36.3  12.10     38,534 
Congo 3  3.6  1.20      38,534 
Senegal  5  9.9  1.98  157  35,251 
Barbados 5      0.00  29  30,467 
Nicaragua 6  5.3  0.88  118  30,443 
Democratic Republic of the Congo  2  51.2  17.07  168  30,506 
Uganda  3     0.00  146  27,287 
Zambia  6  10.7  1.78  164  25,690 
Fiji 0  0.8  0.00  81  25,649 
Swaziland 0  1.1  0.00  137  25,636 
Armenia 0  3.1  0.00  82  24,084 
Antigua and Barbuda  0  0.1  0.00  55  24,084 
Belize 0  0.3  0.00  99  24,084 
Benin  1  6.6  6.60  161  24,084 
Burkina Faso  5  12.6  1.40  175  24,084 
Burundi  2  6.6  3.30  173  24,084 
Central African Republic  0  3.8  0.00  169  24,084 
Chad  0  8.3  0.00  167  24,084 
Djibouti  1  0.7  0.70  154  24,084 
Dominica 0  0.1  0.00  95  24,084 
Gambia  0  1.4  0.00  155  24,084 
Georgia 2  5.2  2.60  97  24,084 
Guinea  2  8.4  4.20  160  24,084 
Guinea-Bissau  0  1.4  0.00  172  24,084 
Guyana 0  0.8  0.00  104  24,084 
Kyrgyz Republic  2  5.1  2.55  110  24,084 
Lesotho  1  1.8  1.80  145  24,084 
Malawi  0  11.9  0.00  165  24,084 
Mali  1  12.6  12.60  174  24,084 
Mauritania  4  2.8  0.70  152  24,084 
Niger  0  11.5  0.00  176  24,084 
Rwanda  1  8.3  8.30  159  24,084 
Sierra Leone  0  4.8  0.00  177  24,084 
Solomon Islands  0  0.5  0.00  124  24,084 
Suriname 0  0.4  0.00  67  24,084 
Togo  0  4.8  0.00  143  24,084 
Haiti  2  8.2  2.05  153  24,082 
Mozambique  2  18.5  9.25  171  24,080 
Maldives  0  0.3  0.00  84  24,069 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  0  0.1  0.00  87  24,058 
Saint Lucia  0  0.1  0.00  71  24,058 
Mongolia 5  2.6  0.52  117  24,055 
Albania 2  3.1  1.55  65  24,050 
Saint Kitts and Nevis  0     0.00  39  24,043 
Grenada 0  0.1  0.00  93  24,042 
Madagascar  3  16.9  5.63  150  24,040   35
Moldova 2  4.3  2.15  113  19,220 
European Communities  17     0.00       
Cambodia   4             
Nepal   2             
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Annex 4.  WTO Members by category as of October 2004 
 
There is no formal WTO definition of what qualifies as a ‘developing country’. The claim for ‘developing 
country’ status is determined by individual Member States. Some countries classify themselves as 
developing countries for some agreements and not others. The category of Least Developed Country is 
determined by UNCTAD according to a fixed set of criteria.   
 
Developed Countries  Developing Countries  Developing Countries (cont)  Least Developed 
Countries 
Australia Albania  Kenya  Angola 
Austria  Antigua and Barbuda  Kuwait  Bangladesh 
Belgium Argentina  Kyrgyz  Republic  Benin 
Canada Armenia  Latvia  Burkina  Faso 
Czech Republic  Bahrain  Liechtenstein  Burundi 
Denmark Barbados  Lithuania  Cambodia 
Finland  Belize  Macao, China  Central African Republic 
France Bolivia  Malaysia  Chad 
Germany Botswana  Malta 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
Greece Brazil Mauritius  Djibouti 
Hungary Brunei  Darussalam  Moldova  Gambia 
Iceland Bulgaria  Mongolia  Guinea 
Ireland Cameroon  Morocco  Guinea-Bissau 
Italy Chile  Namibia  Haiti 
Japan China,  Peoples  Republic  Nicaragua  Lesotho 
Korea, Republic of  Colombia  Nigeria  Madagascar 
Luxembourg Congo  Oman  Malawi 
Mexico Costa  Rica  Pakistan  Maldives 
Netherlands, Kingdom of  Cote d'Ivoire  Panama  Mali 
New Zealand  Croatia  Papua New Guinea  Mauritania 
Norway Cuba  Paraguay  Mozambique 
Poland  Cyprus  Peru  Myanmar, Union of 
Portugal Dominica  Philippines  Nepal 
Slovak Republic  Dominican Republic  Qatar  Niger 
Spain Ecuador  Romania  Rwanda 
Sweden  Egypt  St. Kitts and Nevis  Senegal 
Switzerland  El Salvador  Saint Lucia  Sierra Leone 
Turkey  Estonia  St. Vincent and the Grenadines  Solomon Islands 
United Kingdom of  
Great Britain  European Communities  Singapore  Togo 
United States of America  Fiji  Slovenia  Tanzania 
 
Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia South  Africa  Uganda 
 Gabon  Sri  Lanka  Zambia 
 Georgia  Suriname   
 Ghana  Swaziland   
 Grenada  Chinese  Taipei   
 Guatemala  Thailand   
 Guyana  Trinidad  and  Tabago   
 Honduras  Tunisia   
  Hong Kong, China  United Arab Emirates   
 India  Uruguay   
 Indonesia  Venezuela   
 Israel  Zimbabwe   
 Jamaica     
 Jordan       37
 






%  Total Involvement in 
WTO Disputes % 
United States  74  21.96  81  26.29  24.03 
European Communities  63  18.69  52  16.88  17.83 
Canada 25  7.42  11  3.57  5.58 
Brazil 21  6.23  12  3.9  5.12 
India 16  4.75  16  5.19  4.96 
Argentina 10  2.96  15  4.87  3.87 
Mexico 14  4.15  10  3.25  3.72 
Korea 11  3.26  13  4.22  3.72 
Japan 11  3.26  13  4.22  3.72 
Chile 9  2.67  10  3.25  2.95 
Australia 7  2.77  9  2.92  2.48 
Thailand 10  2.96  1  0.32  1.7 
Turkey 2  0.59  7  2.27  1.39 
Philippines 5  1.48  3  0.97  1.24 
Indonesia 3  0.89  4  1.29  1.09 
Guatemala 5  1.48  2  0.65  1.09 
Honduras 6  1.78  0  0  0.93 
Hungary 4  1.19  2  0.65  0.93 
Peru 2  0.59  4  1.29  0.93 
Ecuador 2  0.59  3  0.97  0.78 
Colombia 4  1.19  1  0.32  0.78 
New Zealand  5  1.48  0  0  0.78 
Poland 3  0.89  1  0.32  0.62 
Pakistan 2  0.59  2  0.65  0.62 
Switzerland 4  1.19  0  0  0.62 
Egypt 0  0  3  0.97  0.47 
Nicaragua 2  0.59  1  0.32  0.47 
Venezuela 1  0.3  2  0.65  0.47 
Czech Republic  1  0.3  2  0.65  0.47 
Belgium 0  0  3  0.97  0.47 
Costa Rica  3  0.89  0  0  0.47 
Ireland 0  0  3  0.97  0.47 
Dominican Republic  0  0  2  0.65  0.32 
China 1  0.3  1  0.32  0.32 
Uruguay 1  0.3  1  0.32  0.32 
Romania 0  0  2  0.65  0.32 
Trinidad and Tobago  0  0  2  0.65  0.32 
France 0  0  2  0.65  0.32 
Panama 2  0.59  0  0  0.32 
Slovak Republic  0  0  2  0.65  0.32 
Malaysia 1  0.3  1  0.32  0.32 
South Africa  0  0  2  0.65  0.32 
Bangladesh (LDC)  1  0.3  0  0  0.15 
Croatia 0  0  1  0.32  0.15 
Antigua and Barbuda  1  0.3  0  0  0.15 
Hong Kong  1  0.3  0  0  0.15 
Chinese Taipei  1  0.3  0  0  0.15   38
Norway 1  0.3  0  0  0.15 
Slovakia 0  0  1  0.32  0.15 
Greece 0  0  1  0.32  0.15 
Netherlands 0  0  1  0.32  0.15 
Sweden 0  0  1  0.32  0.15 
Denmark 0  0  1  0.32  0.15 
Portugal 0  0  1  0.32  0.15 
Sri Lanka  1  0.3  0  0  0.15 
Singapore 1  0.3  0  0  0.15 
   39
 
 
Annex 6.  Examples of disputes for which the ACWL has provided advice  
    
 
  For Indonesia, in the consultations phase in Korea - Anti-dumping Duties on Imports of Certain Paper from 
Indonesia 
  For Bangladesh, in the consultations phase in India - Anti-dumping Measures on Batteries from Bangladesh 
  For Ecuador, in the consultations phase in Ecuador - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Medium 
Density Fireboard 
  For Honduras, in the consultations phase and in the panel proceedings in Dominican Republic – Measures 
Affecting the Importation of Cigarettes 
  For Nicaragua, in the consultations phase in Mexico - Certain Measures Preventing the Importation of Black 
Beans from Nicaragua 
  For Thailand, in the consultations phase and in the panel proceedings in EC - Customs Classification of Frozen 
Boneless Chicken Cuts 
  For Thailand, in the consultations phase and in the panel proceedings in EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar 
  For the Philippines, in the consultations phase in Australia – Certain Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Fresh Pineapple 
  For the Philippines, in the consultations phase and in the panel proceedings in Australia - Certain Measures 
Affecting the Importation of Fresh Fruit and Vegetables  
  For Ecuador, in the panel proceedings in Turkey – Certain Import Procedures for Fresh Fruit 
  For India, in the pre-appeal stage in EC- Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from 
India  
  For Paraguay, in the panel proceedings as a third party in EC - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff 
Preferences to Developing Countries 
  For India, in the panel and Appellate Body proceedings in European Communities – Conditions for the 
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries 
  For India, in the panel proceedings in US – Rules of Origin for Textiles and Apparel Products 
  For Peru, in the panel and Appellate Body proceedings in EC – Trade Description of Sardines 
  For India, in the panel and Appellate Body proceedings in India – Measures Affecting the Automobile 
Industry. 
  For Pakistan, in the Appellate Body proceedings in United-States - Transitional Safeguard Measures on Cotton 
Yarn   
Provided through the hiring of external legal counsel 
  For Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, in their participation as third parties in EC - Conditions for the 
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